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With the objectives which concern Judge Vanderbilt and with what he
thinks worth working for there is little or no disagreement. Many enlight-
ened lawyers share them though few have worked for them so hard as he. But
along the way, there are dicta to argue about, as is customary among lawyers.
For instance, do lawyers lack a sense of individual responsibility for leader-
ship in public opinion? The author says so. This reviewer would make the
criticism differently to the effect that lawyers too often lead public opinion
without adequate knowledge on which to express views, much less argue for
them.
Again, how much must the lawyer know and how much of it should the law
schools try to teach him? Must he know "both the common law and the civil
law on a comparative basis ?" Have the law schools "lamentably failed to ap-
preciate their responsibility for the educational qualifications of their students
in the way . . . the medical schools have?" It is probably true that "In very
few of our law schools . . . is any consideration given to the primary impor-
tance of lawyers assuming individual responsibility for party leadership or in-
teresting themselves in local affairs." But should there be, except by example
and a general atmosphere recognizing that lawyers have public responsibili-
ties ?
Lawyers in both private and public capacities ought to know a great deal.
Some of what they need to know can be learned in law school. A foundation
for some of it should have been acquired before the student came to law
school. Sometimes it is; sometimes not. But education cannot stop with
graduation. "All too often," says the author, "the lawyer looks on his license
to practice as an official certification that he knows all about the law that he
needs to know for a lifetime." Judge Vanderbilt is certainly right in pointing
out that this point of view is wrong. I doubt that the law schools can supply
the extra learning to make it right. The process of education must be continu-
ous in law as elsewhere. The experience of the joint committee on continuing
legal education of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Associa-
tion is finding, to its great satisfaction, that our profession is rapidly recogniz-
ing that fact.
HERBERT F. GOODRICnt
Dicay's CoNFLIcT OF LAWS. Sixth edition, under the general editorship of
J. H. C. Morris with specialist editors. London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. and
Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 1949. Pp. cxxix, 912.
DicaY's sixth edition of Conflict of Laws is out with full standard equip-
ment including Corrigenda, Preface, Table of Foreign Cases, Table of Cases,
Table of Statutes, Table of Books, Table of Periodicals, Table of Principles
and Rules, Introduction and Index. The book is bound in deluxe fabrikoid
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upholstery, weighs 3 pounds, 7 ounces and sells for 4 pounds, 10 shillings
f.o.b. London, or 12 dollars and 60 cents delivered in New Haven (18 dollars
pre-devaluation exchange).
This work, predecessor in form to the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of the Common Law, was originally (1896) prepared as a categorical
statement of general rules, followed by explanatory comment and illustra-
tions. The new edition follows the same pattern. Inasmuch as the work is
intended to be "essentially a practitioner's book, not a work on theoretical ju-
risprudence," it is to be presumed that this manner of presentation has found
enduring favor with the English bar. "The technique of Rule, Comment and
Illustration," says the general editor, "is not one which all of us would have
adopted if we had been writing our own book on the Conflict of Laws." That
English lawyers react to stimuli of this type much as their American brothers
is suggested by the further observation that "the method has the disadvantage
that it is sometimes apt to produce a false impression of certainty when au-
thority is scanty or conflicting." Indeed, as Falconbridge has pointed out, the
editor admits a "regrettable tendency on the part of [English] judges to treat
Dicey's propositions as a final statement, perfect in form and merely subject to
be checked or modified here and there" (p. xiv). Nevertheless, the general
editor finds that "the method undoubtedly possesses advantages for the prac-
ticing lawyer," a statement probably more accurate in reference to Dicey
where cases and other authority are cited to support blackletter rules than to
the American Restatements.
The new Dicey omits the chapter on British nationality on the adequate
grounds that its relation to Conflict of Laws is all but negligible and on the
more dubious grounds that the British Nationality Act of 1948 has so compli-
cated the subject that-hardly anybody can understand it. The reader also gets
the somewhat irrelevant information that for the convenience of practitioners
who have been accustomed to find an account of nationality within the pages
of Dicey, a treatment of the subject by one of the specialist editors will be
published in another book.
Also omitted from this edition are most of the references to American cases
because, among other reasons, of the difficulty of keeping up with them "and
the consequent risk of referring to cases that no longer represent the law."
The book is replete, however, with general references to the standard Ameri-
can works on the subject including those of Story, Beale, Goodrich, Lorenzen
and Cook, as well as to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.
A valuable contribution of the sixth edition is its treatment of the highly im-
portant preliminary problems of the Conflict of Laws, most of which, appar-
ently, the collective conscience of the editors would not permit them to reduce
to Rule, Comment and Illustration. One will search in vain in the index to
the first edition for any reference to renvoi, qualification or characterization,
although there is a footnote statement of the case of Collier v. Rivaz, 2 Curt.
855 (1841) (p. 77), and a brief discussion of the ambiguity in the phrase "law
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of a country" (pp. 5, 6). The fifth edition (1932) contains a somewhat more
extended discussion of renvoi in the Appendix and a brief footnote reference
to primary characterization (p. 43). Indeed, we have it from the general edi-
tor that it was not until 1934: that the problem of characterization was intro-
duced to English Lawyers (p. 62).1 The sixth edition contains an adequate
survey of the learning on these intriguing subjects as well as some critical
comments by the editors.
To one familiar with English cases such as Re Annesley, [1926] Ch. 692, Re
Ross, [1930] 1 Ch. 377, Re Askew, [1930] 2 Ch. 259, Re O'Keefe, [1940]
Ch. 124, and Re Duke of Wellington, [1947] Ch. 506, it may come as a mild
surprise to learn that the law of a given country means "usually the local or
domestic law which the courts of that country apply to the decisions of a case
to which the Rule refers." And yet, as is correctly pointed out, the total renvoi
theory has never been applied by English courts outside the field of succession
and personal status. This fact induces the editors to differ from the state-
ments of law contained in the fifth edition (p. 866) and come to the plausible
conclusion that "the truth would appear to be that in some situations the doc-
trine is convenient and promotes justice, and that in other situations the doc-
trine is inconvenient and ought to be rejected" (p. 56).
The problem of characterization is handled largely by summarizing the
views of the principal authors who have written in English on the subject,
especially Beckett, Lorenzen, Falconbridge, Cheshire, Robertson and Cook.
The editors are reluctant to accept the distinction between primary and sec-
ondary characterization (to say nothing of tertiary characterization) and are
hospitable neither to the suggestion of solution by reference to the law of the
forum nor to characterization by the lex cautsae. Instead, they indicate a prefer-
ence for Falconbridge's view that the court of the forum should consider the
provisions of any potentially applicable laws in their context before definitely
selecting the proper law-a principle which, the editors believe, will make the
process of characterization "fully flexible." At this point, at least one reader
gets the impression of detachment from reality which so frequently accom-
panies a discussion of theories in a vacuum. There is little or no treatment of
the policy considerations concealed in the characterization problem and barely
a suggestion of any value-standards by which these policies can be measured.
And if it be suggested that the English writers are far less concerned about
such matters than American or Continental scholars, it may be questioned that
a major work designed as "essentially a practitioner's book" should assume
that the English lawyer is content to practice his profession without an under-
standing of what he is talking about.
Finally, in this connection, there is included in the treatment of these pre-
liminary matters a discussion of the less frequently noted "incidental question"
(including those of the second degree), i.e. the problem involved where the
principal issue is referred by the forum's Conflict of Laws rule to the appro-
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priate foreign law but there bob up subsidiary or collateral questions which
themselves involve foreign elements. Should the subsidiary or collateral issues
be governed by the appropriate Conflict of Laws rule of the forum or by the
Conflict of Laws rule of the foreign law which governs the main question?
The editors hesitatingly indicate a preference for the Conflict of Laws rule of
the forum, quoting Nussbaum 2 for the statement that not a single English,
American, or Continental case has been found which so much as discusses the
problem of the "incidental question." 3
In conclusion, it may be said that the sixth edition of Dicey's book, in the
main, perpetuates the virtues and the faults of the original work. What Dicey
called the "positive method" as distinguished from the "theoretical method" is
religiously followed. The many important developments in the Conflict of
Laws since the date of the fifth edition (1932), especially as they have af-
fected English law, are reflected. The recent English cases have been col-
lected with painstalking care by J. H. C. Morris4 and his corps of specialist edi-
tors5 and incorporated with skill into the running documentation. The Rules
have been appropriately modified or changed, new exceptions added and cor-
responding Comment and Illustrations added, deleted or qualified. Dicey's
sixth edition, although something less than inspired, is a good job, done in the
solid tradition of English legal scholarship and, on the whole, is reasonably
well calculated to serve the purpose intended by the original author and the
new editors.
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2. PINCI LES OF PRIVATE ImTERNATrONAL LAW 105 (1943).
3. Here again, the American reader is apt to lose patience with the slavish adher-
ence to the "positive method." The editors express their preference as "more consistent
with the approach" adopted by the House of Lords in Shaw v. Gould, L.R. 3 H.I 55
(1868). It does not leap to this reviewer's eye in any persuasive form just why the au-
thors of a major work on a difficult subject, with no examination of the policy factors in-
volved, or indeed with no critical analysis of any ind, should take a position based solely
on "the approach" of the House of Lords in a seventy-year old case which is only du-
biously in point on a part of the question involved.
4. Of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Fellow and Tutor of 11agdalen College, Ox-
ford; All Souls Lecturer in Private International Law.
5. The imposing array includes L. Cowen, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Fel-
low and Tutor of Oriel College, Oxford; Vinerian Law Scholar; R. Cross, Solicitor,
Fellow and Tutor of Magdalen College, Oxford; 0. Kahn-Freund, of the Middle Temple,
Barrister-at-Law; Reader in Law in the University of London; K. Lipstein, Lecturer in
Law in the University of Cambridge; C Parry, of Gray's Inn and the South-Eastern
Circuit, Barrister-at-Law; Fellow and Tutor of Dovning College, Cambridge; Lecturer
in Law in the University of Cambridge; R. S. Welsh, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-
Law; Advocate of the Supreme Court of South Africa, Vinerian Law Scholar; and B. A.
Worthley, of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law; Professor of Jurisprudence and International
Law in the University of Manchester.
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